Most workers have one employment contract that is explicit and another one that is implicit. The explicit employment contract specifies working hours, compensation, and job tasks.
The implicit contract involves expectations about the extent to which the employment relationship is not just a payment for labor on the spot market but instead is likely to continue over time. The possibility of a longer-term commitment between an employer and its employees in turn has a number of implications: for example, whether firms will seek to avoid mass layoffs unless or until absolutely necessary; whether firms may cushion the wages and compensation of employees to some extent from broad swings in the economy; whether employees will show some degree of loyalty to the firm; and what kind of investments in human capital the firm will be willing to finance.
From the standpoint of the economic risks faced by households, one of the single biggest concerns is the risk of job loss-and in particular, the risk that employers may be doing less recently than they might have done in the past to shield employees from this risk. By its nature, the provisions of the implicit employment contract cannot be observed directly. However, it is possible to compile a range of evidence bearing on some of the central issues relating to why employers decide to trim jobs; why and how firms decide to lay off employees; job tenure and the length of time that a worker can expect to remain with an employer; how job loss affects workers in terms of subsequent wages and health; and the effects of job loss on short-and longrun corporate performance. This paper will argue that, along a number of these dimensions, the nature of the workerfirm employment relationship may have changed substantially in recent years-a group of changes that as a whole have negatively affected the lives of workers and produced modest, if any, benefits for firms. This erosion of the implicit employment contract suggests that if employers have become less involved with cushioning the blow of unemployment and avoiding layoffs where possible, then public policy might have a role to play in spreading the burden of a down labor market so that the burden is not borne so heavily by those who lose their jobs entirely.
The Employment Contract and Reasons for Layoffs
The standard labor "spot market" model of the labor market described in textbooks assumes that wages are set equal to worker's marginal products and are constantly updated depending on economic conditions. Examples of spot markets can be markets for day laborers or, perhaps less so, for temporary help services (Autor, 2001) . A different view of the labor market is based on "contracts," whereby the employer may help keep the worker from fluctuations and risk in the market (for example, Devereux and Hart, 2005) . For examples of this literature, Okun (1981) and Bertrand (2004) discuss the "invisible handshake" where an "implicit" contract regarding compensation and work is made between the worker and the firm. Devereaux and Hart (2005) provide evidence that is consistent with spot labor markets in Britain. Kotlikoff and Wise (1985) consider the "spot" versus "contract" views of the U.S. labor market with particular emphasis on pensions. They find a large spike in values of pensions to individuals and doubt the existence of associated large changes in marginal products, evidence which they argue is inconsistent with the spot market model and favors the contract model.
To the extent that implicit labor contracts exist, firms may shield workers from economic vicissitudes by, for example, not readily laying them off except under extreme duress, and perhaps also insulating their wages and benefits at the cost of profits during downturns. (It should be noted that keeping workers on during downturns may also in some cases be nothing more than profit-seeking behavior by a firm looking to avoid the substantial hiring and firing costs that some firms face.) Some also argue that the employment contract may also include reciprocal obligations from workers to firms. Loyalty from workers to firms would be very difficult to measure, but would be an interesting subject for (no doubt, interdisciplinary) future work.
It is often difficult to determine why a worker and a firm separated: Was it the worker's decision, the firm's decision, or some mixture of both? Job leaving can be voluntary for many reasons, including normal retirement, the lure of a better job, a family geographic move that necessitates a new job, and others. In addition, while being fired for "cause" is certainly not voluntary, it doesn't seem as if such cases should count as a fraying of the implicit labor contract. If we want to investigate a possible decline in employers' perceived obligations under implicit labor contracts, we might want to instead consider the prevalence of layoffs. Of course, there is a long list of euphemisms for this kind of job loss including "reductions in force," "adjustment," "resizing," "rightsizing," and "restructuring." Some of the work in this area uses evidence from the Displaced Workers Supplement to the Current Population Survey. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2008), displaced workers are defined as "persons 20 years of age or older who lost or left jobs because their plant or company closed or moved, there was insufficient work for them to do, or their position or shift was abolished." According to the usual government definition of this kind of job loss, the lost job must have been held at least three years. This minimum job tenure of three-years is interesting in light of the relatively large volume of "churning" in the labor market, which I will discuss further below.
Some evidence suggests that the labor market is more fluid than in the past. Average tenure of workers is falling and employees seem less "loyal" to particular employers. Further, journalistic stories like Tuna (2008) report that "lifetime employment, a hallmark at some employers in the US for generations appears to be disappearing." These stories are backed up by academic studies like Cappelli (2005, p. 110) , who notes: "For employees, economic downturns are now more catastrophic, because more workers are laid off more quickly with less chance of being rehired, while those who remain employed find their employment conditions worsening.
But upturns are now more advantageous, as employers bid not only for entry-level help, as they have in the past, but also for experienced workers. Why do firms lay off workers? The past four decades have seen a quite substantial change in the reported reasons for job loss. Using a sample frame that included all firms that were ever in the Fortune 500 between 1970 and 2007, data on each job loss announcement described in the Wall Street Journal were recorded. For these 5,353 instances, the complete Wall Street Journal article was then read and a variety of information was collected. This information includes the primary, secondary, and tertiary reason for the layoff, the number of workers affected, and whether white-or blue-collar workers were included. 1 There is anecdotal evidence that most layoffs by these firms are recorded in the Wall Street Journal as many announcements containing only a few workers are included in these articles (see Hallock, 1998 , for a more detailed discussion). Although I cannot tell which other firms are making layoffs, I can estimate of the fraction of workers employed by these companies relative to employment in the United
States. Using an independent sample of 727 large U.S. companies, I estimate that they employ 26.3 million workers. In 2009, 146.2 million people were employed in the U.S. economy. Thus, while the firms for which I have collected layoff information certainly do not employ the majority of workers in the United States, they do employ a sizeable minority, especially of private sector workers.
Insert Table 1 Here
The rows of Table 1 list 18 possible reasons why a firm in these data announced job
reductions. The first column shows data for all years, and the subsequent four columns relate to specific decades : the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000-2007. Clearly the category "slump in demand" is the most frequent reason given, overall and in each decade. However, substantial variation exists over time. To see this more clearly, in Figure 1 , I have grouped the "reasons" into six general categories: "reorganization" (reorganization, restructuring, and in-house merger), "plant closing" (leaving market and plant closing), "slump in demand" (slump in demand, excess supply, and structural), "cost issues" (cost control, posting losses, increase earnings, and restore 1 In Billger and Hallock (2005) and Farber and Hallock (2009) , my coauthors and I use the first 30 years of this 38-year data set. See those papers for more detail on the data construction. profitability), "other" (increased competition, merger, bankruptcy, strike, and other), and "missing." Note the scale is the same in each sub-figure, except for "slump in demand." While these groupings are of course in some sense arbitrary, they do reveal some dramatic changes over time.
Insert Figure 1 Here
The "slump in demand" category follows the business cycle quite closely with spikes around the times of the recessions in the early 1980s and 1990s and during the end of the hightech "bubble." However, even taking these factors into account, job loss specifically due to "slump in demand" seems to be less prevalent than in the past. One possible interpretation of this finding is that firms are becoming less inclined to see layoffs as a result of a broad economic downturn and more inclined to view them as a natural competitive response that is sometimes needed even in good times as a response to changing economic conditions. In a similar spirit, announcements due to "reorganization" became progressively more prevalent during the 1980s and 1990s, when some have argued that stock market pressures led firms to try to be "lean" and encouraged firms to shrink employment. However, the number of announcements categorized as "reorganization" dropped quite a bit in the early 2000s. In some sense, this evidence is consistent with the fact that the implicit employment contract is changing or that layoffs are becoming more "routine." It also could be that firms are offering different justifications for layoffs than they did in the past.
Perhaps the most striking pattern in the data (going back to One might wonder about the quality of these "reported reasons" data. After all, the information likely came from a press release, and then was filtered through a reporter, and then through an academic researcher. Street Journal is speaking to potential investors, so the spin is to make opportunities to buy the company stock." A senior manager at a wholesale trade firm told me: "They won't admit poor judgment. Some truth, but it doesn't include 'We screwed up '" (Hal-lock, 2006) . It is also possible that the stated categories could also reflect herding-that is, if some set of firms states "foreign competition" as a reason for a layoff, others might say the same. Thus, the information content of the categories is not necessarily correct; the information on layoffs should be.
The distribution of these announcements, both when they are made during the year and when they are made during a week, suggests that layoff announcements have become more routine. As shown in Figure 2 , in the 1970s, layoff announcements were commonly made either early in the year or late in the year, which is consistent with the idea that firms put off layoffs How have patterns of long-term employment changed over time? Farber (2007 Farber ( , 2008 uses data from the Current Population Survey from 1973 to 2006 by birth cohort to examine changes in the length of employment relationships. He finds that both 1) mean tenure and 2) the fraction of workers working at least ten or at least 20 years at the same employer have each fallen. Moreover, these changes are not evenly distributed across the workforce. Farber also finds more of what he calls "churning," or short-term jobs, defined as the fraction of workers whose job seniority is less than one year. He concludes that younger workers are much less likely than older workers to eventually end up having a long-term job with the same employer. Farber (2008) These patterns suggest that although the aggregate reductions in job tenure across the economy are not enormous, the changes in job tenure for younger workers trying to establish themselves and for older men working in the private sector are quite real. From the point of view of these workers, any implicit employment contract promising that employers will protect their job tenure would appear to be fading.
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Another way to consider whether the employment contract is changing, in addition to considering the decline in job durations, is to see whether firms are becoming more "trigger happy" about layoffs. One way to check for this would be to see if the propensity to layoff in response to some factors (such as an economic shock of a given magnitude or a decline in sales revenue) has changed over time. One could do this by creating a panel dataset of company-year observations over time (though understanding this conceptually is much easier than defining it or measuring it operationally). One could then see if job loss announcements in any year (or quarter Given the suggestive evidence that the employment contract has changed, the next logical question is why? Perhaps this is due to the decline in unionization in the United States. Perhaps companies have become more powerful relative to workers in the past generation or so.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that layoffs are now more "culturally acceptable" than they were a generation ago. In part due to the fact that so many have lost their jobs, the social stigma from losing a job seems to have declined as well.
Costs of Job Loss to Workers
If workers who involuntarily lose their jobs find new jobs quickly with wages and benefits near the same level and without discernible longer-term negative effects on themselves or their families, then we might not view job loss as much of a contributor to household risk. In fact, one executive publicly stated in a symposium I moderated at the University of Illinois that he had twice lost jobs involuntarily, and he thought it can be good news to a worker when he or she loses a job. He argued that search is costly, and when workers are forced to search for new work, they can end up with a better job match than previously. (Many in the audience vigorously disagreed!) However, the evidence suggests that on average job loss has large and long-lasting negative effects on workers' subsequent employment and earnings, as well as on physical and emotional health.
In the seminal paper on the issue of earnings losses after displacement, Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) used administrative data from Pennsylvania during 1974-1986 on workers' earnings histories with details about their companies to consider the magnitude and the time pattern of wages for displaced workers. The administrative data are a very large sample, which allows the authors to apply techniques from the program evaluation literature. The authors find that high-tenured workers leaving "distressed" firms suffer long-term losses on the order of 25 percent of their wages. Interestingly, they also find that on average wage losses begin before workers lose their jobs, depend on local labor market conditions and industries, and are significant even in cases where workers find jobs in similar companies. Also, see Kletzer (1989) for an interesting investigation of the role of previous job tenure on earnings after job loss.
In a follow-up to Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) working-age population were Unemployment Insurance recipients during the time of the study.
Eliason and Storrie (2006) study long-term effects of displacement in Sweden using linked employer-employee data. They find that workers in Sweden also suffer losses in the short run and in the long run of four years.
A host of other papers estimate earnings losses following displacement using a variety of sources, including the Displaced Workers Supplement (for example, Topel, 1990; Farber, 1997; Carrington, 1993; Neal, 1995) ; the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (for example, Ruhm, 1991; Huff Stevens, 1997) ; the Health and Retirement Study (for example, Couch, 1998; Chan and Huff Stevens, 2004) ; and the National Longitudinal Survey (for example, Fairlie and Kletzer, 2003) . In general, these studies find smaller negative effects on wages post-displacement than do administrative studies. Von Wachter, Handwerker, and Hildreth (2009) The earlier evidence on job tenure suggested that job loss may bear especially heavily on older men. Chan and Huff Stevens (2001) consider job loss among older workers using the Health and Retirement Study. They find that, for workers who lose jobs after age 55, the employment rate is 20 percentage points lower than the employment rate of similar workers who were not displaced. Elder (2004) perhaps part of the reason that certain workers were laid off is that their physical or mental health 3 A rich literature in applied psychology explores the effects of job loss on the "survivors" of layoffs. I will not discuss that literature in this paper. The interested reader might begin with Brockner, Konovsky, Cooper-Schneider, Folger, Martin, and Bies (1994), Mishra and Spreitzer (1998) , and the references cited therein. 4 Some evidence from other countries suggests these factors may be less important. Browning, Dano, and Heinesen (2006) study men in Denmark from 1981-1999 and find no evidence that being displaced from a job is related to being hospitalized for a stress-related disease. Martikainen, Maki, and Jantti (2007, p. 1070 ) study the relationship between unemployment and mortality for Finnish men and find "no excess mortality…among those who, at baseline, were employed at workplaces that had experienced reductions in employment." was hindering their job performance. But mass layoffs often do not show great selectivity. Even if the precise magnitudes are not clear, workers who experience involuntary job loss do seem at risk of potentially serious health outcomes.
Effects of Job Loss on Firms
It would seem reasonable that firms let workers go because it is in the best interest of the firm-or the firm, obviously, would not have executed the job loss. However, firms may have chosen to reduce jobs in pursuit of short-run gains that turn out to be illusory in the long term, or layoffs might be undertaken for reasons that benefit top management rather than the firm as a whole. This section investigates the effects of job loss on companies, including outcomes for short-run stock prices, for stock prices and viability in the longer run, and for pay of top executives. I have used a sample frame that includes all firms that were ever in the Fortune 500 in any year between 1970 and 2007 inclusive, as described above. It is worth considering whether these actually represent layoffs or just announcements that never turned into actual layoffs.
While there is no way to know for sure, interviews with 40 senior managers yields anecdotal evidence consistent with the belief that a large majority of these announcements lead to actual layoffs (Hallock, 2006) .
Using these data on 5,353 layoffs, I calculate cumulative average excess returns using value-weighted return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago. The excess return is the part of the movement in the stock return of a company that is not correlated with overall market movement in stock returns and presumably reflects unexpected firm-specific factors. 5 Figure 5 displays the average cumulative excess 5 Let index time in trading days and let index the companies. In the first-stage, , the daily stock return for the company, is regressed on , the value-weighted return for the market. = + + . Next, for days around the event, the daily abnormal (or excess) returns can be calculated as follows: = − ( � +̂), where � and ̂ are estimated in the earlier equation. This regression is run for some period in the past, which in this study ranged from 60 days before to 30 days before the event.
returns over a three-day window-the day before, the day of, and the day after the event-for One might ask whether the stock price reactions reported in Figure 5 may have been influenced by "other" news in the companies. For example, perhaps lower-than-expected earnings were announced on the same day as the layoff. To isolate the effect of layoff announcements, the second line in Figure 5 repeats the analysis after removing any announcement that is within 30 days of another layoff, earnings announcement, stock split announcement, or dividend announcement for the same company. This change does not markedly alter the main findings.
It would be ideal if we could know exactly by how much the firm is better or worse off after restructuring employment or letting workers go. Unfortunately, this is not exactly what the cumulative excess return analysis tells us. If the layoff was completely unanticipated by the market, the cumulative excess return would be an estimate of the total net present value change in expected profitability from laying off workers versus not laying them off. But sometimes the "market" does anticipate some layoffs, and some interviews I've had with managers even suggest that market participants called for the layoff. That said, the cumulative excess returns could be measuring the change in the expected profitability for laying off workers now relative to potentially laying them off later.
Regression analysis shows that the stock price reaction to job loss announcements has, indeed, changed over time. Table 2 reports the results from regressions of the three-day cumulative excess returns on indicators for decade (the excluded decade is 1970-1979) and "reasons" for the layoffs (the reasons reported earlier are condensed into five categories: reorganization, plant closing, slump in demand, cost, and other (the excluded category is "missing reason"). From column (1), one can see that the excess returns in the 1970s (the constant term since the 1970s are the excluded category) were -0.654 percent. The returns in the 1980s were higher (less negative); the returns from the 1990s, still higher; and the returns in the 2000s, not statistically significant from those in the 1970s. Furthermore, changes in the mix of reasons for job loss announcements over time do not explain the change in the returns to job loss announcement over time. That is, when controlling for "reason" indicator variables in the regression reported in column 2, the coefficients on decade indicators do not materially change. This is evidence that the change in stock price reaction to job loss announcements over time cannot be fully explained by "reasons." In Farber and Hallock (2009) , my coauthor and I investigate a set of other potential explanations for the change in the stock price reaction of job loss announcements over time. We find that the short-term stock price reaction to job loss announcements has changed markedly over time and is now quite modest. Presumably one reason the effect is modest on average is that in some cases announced layoffs signal a decline in the prospects of the firm, but in other cases they signal a plausible proposal to improve the financial condition of a firm-and the average picks up both of these effects.
Insert Table 2 Here
The direct economic interpretation of the stock price reaction to layoff announcements is difficult. On one hand, the layoffs probably convey some news about the firm's state. On the other hand, the effect could signal the effect of the layoff on future profits. The truth is likely some of each-and so the stock price reaction should not be thought of as measuring the pure benefit to the firm of laying off workers to a world where they retained them.
Determining the long-term effects of job loss on company viability and profitability is difficult. Dial and Murphy (1995) describe an extraordinary change at General Dynamics that began in 1991. The company hired a new management team and committed to a strategy of creating shareholder value in the face of a potentially serious fall in demand for defense-related products. The firm also specifically tied compensation of senior managers to the creation of shareholder wealth. The firm went through massive job cuts and the firm's profits subsequently increased by a factor of four. Other more systematic studies include Bailey, Bartelsman, and Haltiwanger (1996) who use plant-level data from the Longitudinal Research Database to investigate downsizing and productivity in the 1980s. These data are based on plants, not firms.
The authors find that plants that increased productivity and employment contribute nearly as much to overall productivity growth as plants that increased productivity but decreased employment. Cascio, Young, and Morris (1997) , who use 5,479 instances of changes in employment, investigate the relationship between these employment changes and return on assets (their measure of profitability) and return on common stock, but they use employment data that are not audited. They find that companies that just lowered employment performed no better than other companies. Given the limitations of the data, the longer-term impacts of job loss on company performance are less clear and more work needs to be done in this area. 6 But it seems safe to say that in some cases, based on the evidence from short-run and long-run firm performance, mass layoffs can contribute at most modestly (in some years) to a more successful and profitable firm.
Given that workers are certainly worse off and firms seem to be not much better off on average (except in some years) subsequent to job loss, it is natural to ask whether executives are better off. Little evidence exists on this point. In Hallock (1998) , I investigate the relationship between the compensation of chief executive officers of companies and whether those companies lay off workers. Firms that announce layoffs in the previous year pay their chief executive officers more and give them larger percentage raises than firms that do not have at least one layoff announcement in the previous year. However, some characteristics of firms (such as size)
are also correlated with pay of chief executive officers and with job loss. When controls are added for firm characteristics and other variables, any pay premium for laying off workers disappears.
Possible Alternatives to Layoffs and Why They are Not More Frequently Used
Many employees place some degree of reliance on an implicit employment contract that their employers will try to avoid laying them off unless it is strictly necessary. However, a variety of evidence suggests that firms are more willing to lay off workers than they have been in the past. Layoffs have become more common, and there is some evidence that firms appear to be treating those layoffs as more routine. Job tenure has fallen, especially for older men in the private sector. Because an involuntary job loss has a powerful and long-term effect on income, employment, and health, workers have reason to be concerned that they are less protected against the risk of layoff than in the past. There is some suggestive evidence (in some years) that firms can benefit financially from imposing layoffs, at least under certain circumstances, although it is difficult to disentangle those cases in which layoffs are a signal of bad news from those in which layoffs may be the start of rebuilding an improved financial picture for a firm.
Are there potential alternatives to layoffs? A starting point is to consider ways in which the burden of layoffs could be spread across the workforce of a company in a way that would impose less household risk on a few, through mechanisms like widespread reductions in pay, trying to make sure that reductions on hours fall on those most able to bear them, and even widespread Work Sharing Unemployment Insurance (discussed below). However, these mechanisms all share a common problem, which is that many workers want to work full-time for full pay, and that many employers prefer to have a workforce largely made up of full-time workers for a variety of reasons, including the way benefits are provided to workers. Methods for sharing the burden of layoffs may work as a short-term fix if the layoffs will later be reversed.
But if the layoffs are permanent, then the question becomes how to assist more workers into making a quicker transition to a new job.
One option for a firm seeking to avoid layoffs is to find other ways of cutting wages or compensation. Rather than cut 10 percent of its workforce, a company could cut 10 percent from the pool of compensation. A long literature examines the tradeoff between job loss and cuts in wages; for example, Bewley (1999) asks "Why Wages Don't Fall During A Recession." A standard answer in this literature is that wage cuts depress worker morale and productivity across an entire firm; moreover, wage cuts can unleash a problem of adverse selection in which the most skilled employees, who also are more likely to have good outside options, leave the firm, and the firm is left with the employees who lack good outside options and have poor morale besides. Other methods of reducing pay have also been proposed. For example, Gordon (1996, p. 247) argued for "substituting compensatory time as an alternative to time-and-a-half for overtime-meaning that workers would be able to work less some other day if they worked extra hours today." Broad wage cuts or other changes to save on the wage bill may be a viable alternative for some organizations at least for a time, but they are not likely to be a long-term solution. Many workers want full-time, full-pay jobs; many companies argue that they would rather have a smaller, fully employed staff than a larger staff that is not working full-time and is therefore upset about potential lower earnings.
Another approach is to carry out the layoffs, but to let some employees have some degree encouraging employees to take unused vacations and take unpaid leaves, and 4) designating certain Fridays as "voluntary" days off. In the end, the company did have to make layoffs to 2,000 of 25,000 employees, but provided generous severance. Cisco Systems also placed a high value on the importance of treating employees who were laid off well. When Cisco cut its workforce from 38,000 to 30,500, it tried a program of paying employees one-third of their salaries and "lending" them to nonprofits for a year. In this way, the company tried to keep in contact with employees in hope of avoiding retraining costs when demand increased. Cisco made a "Great Places to Work" list during this period. In a related case, Accenture cut 600 support staff in June 2001, but for some staff the company instituted partially paid sabbaticals where the firm paid 20 percent of salary and all benefits and employees could keep laptops, an office phone number, and e-mail. Roughly 1,000 workers took this option. Cascio (2002) provides many more details on these case studies.
A public policy approach to encouraging firms to spread reductions in hours worked across the workforce, rather than laying off a smaller set of workers altogether, is the Work Sharing Unemployment Insurance (WSUI) program discussed by MaCurdy, Pearce, and Kihlthau (2004) . Suppose that all workers in a firm were paid the same and a firm wanted to reduce payroll by 20 percent. It could lay off 20 percent of the workers or it could participate in WSUI and reduce hours by 20 percent for each worker. Under WSUI, each worker could then be eligible for a pro-rated fraction of Unemployment Insurance benefits. From a company point of 7 Gharness and Levine (2000, p. 381) find that people rate layoffs as "more fair" if the chief executive officer voluntarily "shared the pain." They also find that people view layoffs due to "reduced demand" as more fair than those due to "employee suggestions." They suggested that "companies should not punish employees for their efforts." view, regular unemployment insurance and WSUI look financially equivalent: the same total amount is paid in unemployment "taxes." However, proponents argue that under the worksharing approach, firms can save on costs of hiring and retraining if or when demand returns.
MacCurdy, Pearce, and Kihlthau (2004) point out that less than 1 percent of California companies with unemployment insurance claims participated in the work-sharing approach.
Among the reasons they suggest for the low take-up rate are that workers don't like the worksharing approach since it "imposes reductions in pay that can be avoided by acquiring alternative full-time" employment.
Many countries, including Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, and Sweden have work-sharing programs. Seventeen U.S. states have them, but the take-up rate is extremely low.
Other countries provide examples in which a combination of political pressure, social sanctions, and direct economic costs make mass layoffs less likely to occur. For example, in India, the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 is somewhat similar to the U.S. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988, but also has provisions such as, if a business has 50 or more workers, the firm must provide workers with 30 days advance notice and 15 days pay for every year of work (Asher and Mukhopadhaya, 2006) . France and Germany are known to be "high employment protection" countries that spend substantial resources on labor market policy relative to the United States (Auer, 2006) . One executive I interviewed with respect to layoffs told me that it was so difficult to fire workers in France that he will never hire any more workers there (Hallock, 2006) .
However, attempts to prevent layoffs along with similar attempts to block reductions in compensation or in hours worked pose difficulties of their own. Less flexible labor markets make firms reluctant to hire and can contribute to a higher rate of unemployment. Firms may also react by creating a "two-tier" labor market, with one tier of workers who are protected against economic downturns and a second tier of workers who are temporary contract workers and who bear all the costs of layoffs. France, for example, has two types of work contracts: standard contracts require substantial costs of firing workers, and temporary contracts allow employers more flexibility in letting workers go. In a U.S. context, a similar result arises when some organizations try to avoid layoffs by turning to temporary help agencies and outsourcing as a way to help buffer shocks to employment demand at their firms (Autor, 2003) . To put it another way, overly aggressive attempts to block layoffs will spread the costs of labor market shocks in a different direction, to certain of the unemployed and to second-tier unprotected workers.
Thus, a final set of policy alternatives is to accept that layoffs have become a more widespread and easily contemplated business tool, but instead of trying to make layoffs much more costly to firms, public policy could seek to reduce the additional risk to households through mechanisms that help in the transition from one job to another. As one example, Muirhead (2002) offers a business case for educational training for displaced workers. Perhaps changes in these types of programs could lead to reduced household risk from layoffs by speeding the transition to a new job. Reemployment bonuses along the lines of Robins and Spiegelman (2001) are an example of the kind of program that may speed the transition to a new job. In general, the United States spends far less as a fraction of GDP on labor market policies for displaced workers including job search, training, and relocation assistance than many western European countries.
Concluding Comments
The average worker is badly harmed when affected by a layoff, suffering declines in income and in physical and psychological health, while the average firm does not seem to be much better off (except in some years). Top executives don't benefit from job loss either. This leaves economists and policy analysts with a puzzle: if no one seems to be substantially better off and many are worse off, then why do so many people lose jobs through displacement? One possibility is that the benefits of layoffs to firms are large-although perhaps our methods of measuring such phenomena are not strong enough to capture them-and the alternatives to layoffs don't offer these kinds of benefits. Another possibility is that although layoffs are very costly to certain workers, perhaps workers as a group prefer layoffs to one of the "alternatives" discussed in the previous section-that is, perhaps workers prefer an implicit labor contract in which a minority of workers are laid off rather than having a majority of workers sharing cuts in pay or hours.
Yet another possibility is that firms receive only small benefits from layoffs while workers suffer large losses, but firms are the decisionmakers about layoffs, and some inefficiency blocks an outcome in which workers could negotiate with their firms to avoid mass layoffs. In this situation, economists and policy analysts must consider whether, as the implicit employment contract has frayed, changes in the institutions and laws surrounding employment relationships should change as well. At a small scale, one potential change along these lines might alter Work Sharing Unemployment Insurance (WSUI). As it stands now, the costs are identical to firms if they use standard Unemployment Insurance or WSUI. Given that the costs of layoffs to workers are so high, benefits to layoffs for firms are small (or even negative), and the take-up rate for WSUI is so extremely small, one possibility is a system that taxes firms relatively less for short periods of using WSUI. However, revealed preference suggests that WSUI is dominated by standard unemployment insurance. It may be better to consider the efficacy of labor readjustment programs used in other countries. More aggressive and large-scale thinking may be required as society addresses the issue of the fraying of the implicit labor contract to prevent the blow of involuntary job loss from falling so heavily on a small fraction of workers. Table 1 Figure 1 
